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ABSTRACT
Performing non-aggregate range queries over encrypted data
stored on untrusted clouds has been considered by a large body
of work over the last years. However, prior schemes mainly con-
centrate on improving query performance while the scalability di-
mension still remains challenging. Due to heavily pre-processing
incoming data at a trusted component such as encrypting data
and building secure indexes, existing solutions cannot provide
a satisfactory ingestion throughput. In this paper, we overcome
this limitation by introducing a framework for secure range
query processing, FRESQUE, that enables a scalable consumption
throughput while still maintaining strong privacy protection for
outsourced data. Our experiments on real-world datasets show
that FRESQUE can support over 160 thousand record insertions in
a second, when running on a 12-computing node cluster. It also
significantly outperforms one of the most efficient schemes such
as PINED-RQ++ by 43 times on ingestion throughput.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the prosperity of online social networks and web-based
services, a large amount of personal data is collected every second.
To achieve analytical and administrative purposes, it becomes
increasingly desirable for modern systems to support not only
low-latency queries, but also intensive ingestion throughput over
incoming data. For instance, to reduce the impact of seasonal
epidemics (e.g., influenza), participatory surveillance systems,
to name few, have been deployed in recent years such as Flu
Near You [2] in North America, Influenzanet [16] in Europe,
and FluTracking [3, 9] in Australia and New Zealand. These
systems weekly collect symptoms from their participants to track
influenza nation-wide. Such systems are expected to receive a
huge number of records every second.
Due to the significant costs necessary for building and maintain-
ing such systems (e.g., computing and scalability requirements,
human resources), it may be worth to outsource user data to a
cloud service, that can provide lower costs and enable elastic
scaling [14]. However, parts of the data may be sensitive, e.g.,
participants’ symptoms, and sociodemographic data (age, gender,
etc.). Managing sensitive data on a public cloud increases the
risk of unauthorized disclosure since its infrastructure may be
compromised by an adversary. According to a recent survey, 52%
of companies use cloud services that have experienced a data
breach [18].
This paper considers the following cloud computing model (Fig-
ure 1): a collector receives data from multiple data sources and
stores them on a cloud while a client retrieves the data by using
queries. For a simple example, Flu survey participants submit
electronic medical records to a Center for Disease Control and
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Prevention (CDC) that stores the collected data on a cloud. An epi-
demiologist queries these records from the cloud. In this model,
only the cloud is untrusted while the others are trusted.
Figure 1: An architecture of cloud computing
Encryption is a standard technique to ensure the confidentiality
of data stored on untrusted environments like clouds [29, 32, 35].
In this study, we focus on non-aggregate range queries over
encrypted data since they are fundamental operations. For ex-
ample, a doctor, Alice, wants to get encrypted electric records
of the patients whose ages are between a and b. One example
of a range query (expressed with SQL) can be: SELECT * FROM
database WHERE age ≥ a AND age ≤ b.
Although many studies in this line of work have been done over
the last years [5–8, 10, 19, 20, 24, 26, 30, 31, 36], none of them
satisfies real-life scalability requirements. It is also non-trivial to
scale these schemes due to their own limitations. For instance,
Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) methods [8, 36] use bilinear
groups equipped with bilinear maps and hide attributes in an
encrypted vector. However, they suffer from high latency because
it is extremely costly to compute exponentiation and pairing
in a composite-order group. Meanwhile, some recent schemes
[10, 23, 24] attempt to maintain secure indexes, that rely on
Searchable Symmetric Encryption, for efficiency. Unfortunately,
the secure indexes not only create high space overhead, but also
require at least hundreds of second for construction that may lead
to bottlenecks. Even though ArxRange [30] does not experience
long index building time, it incurs prohibitive storage overhead
and only supports a modest ingestion throughput, e.g., about
450 writes per second with caching. Recently, solutions based
on differential privacy [11], e.g., the PINED-RQ family [33, 34],
have been considered and achieve very good performance in
terms of computation and space requirements, however, they
do not render a satisfactory ingestion throughput. In particular,
PINED-RQ [33] incurs congestion as incoming data rate is high.
Meanwhile, PINED-RQ++ [34] experiences modest throughput,
∼46K records/s.
Therefore, we aim at developing a scalable ingestion framework
dedicated to secure range query processing. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper about the architecture of such
system. Our solution is developed based on the PINED-RQ fam-
ily [33, 34]. This choice is motivated by the fact that this family
can achieve both fast range queries and provable security guaran-
tees while the secure index requires small space. More specifically,
we re-design the architecture of PINED-RQ++ [34] in order to
make it fully distributed. That is, we attempt to distributively
process all heavy tasks (e.g., parsing and encrypting data) on a
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set of shared-nothing machines1. By relying on such architecture,
the system can easily scale. Additionally, we introduce a data
representation and an asynchronous publishing method to de-
crease throughput degradation as much as possible. By precisely
coordinating all of them together, our framework can enable
intensive ingestion throughput. Experimental results show that
as compared to (non-)parallel PINED-RQ++ [34], the throughput
is improved by (∼43×) ∼5.6× respectively (NASA dataset [1]).
Furthermore, we also present a new noise management mech-
anism to cope with strong online attackers having background
knowledge about the time distribution of incoming data. This
method also improves the practicality of FRESQUE since it does
not require a pre-defined timestamp distribution as in PINED-
RQ++ (see Section 4.1). In this study, we develop FRESQUE, a
scalable ingestion framework for secure range query processing
on cloud, including the following contributions.
(1) We thoroughly analyze the architecture of the PINED-
RQ family [33, 34], and point out obstacles that prevent
the existing architecture from achieving a high ingestion
throughput. Also, we propose an approach to cope with
offline and online attackers while minimizing the required
knowledge of the collector.
(2) We design an ingestion architecture that enables to distrib-
ute all heavy jobs to multiple workers (computing nodes)
of a cluster. Besides, we present and integrate a data rep-
resentation and an asynchronous publishing method to
this architecture, mitigating throughput degradation.
(3) We extensively evaluate FRESQUE on real-world datasets
to demonstrate its scalability. Particularly, the throughput
of FRESQUE is about 43× higher than that of PINED-RQ++
and being at least one order of magnitude higher than that
of other efficient solutions such as [6, 30, 31].
(4) We formally analyze the security of FRESQUE.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly intro-
duce the problem statement. Section 3 reviews the related work.
We analyze the architecture of the PINED-RQ family in Section 4.
We then describe our framework in Section 5. Section 6 gives se-
curity analyses while Section 7 presents our experimental results.
We discuss an application of our solution in Section 8. Section 9
concludes the paper and gives future work.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
We assume that data sources produce a set of records where all
records have the same number of attributes. These records are
immediately sent to the collector. The dataset stored at the collec-
tor is a relation D(A1, . . . ,An ), where Ai is an attribute. Queries
are non-aggregate one-dimensional range queries. A query Q is
evaluated over the attribute Aq of D, which contains numerical
values. Periodically, the collector pre-processes the dataset, e.g.,
building a secure index over the dataset and encrypting it, prior
to sending it to the cloud.
In this study, we concentrate on the scalability dimension of the
system in terms of ingestion throughput. This metric measures
how many records a system is able to consume within a time
period. The target solution should meet additional requirements,
namely formal security guarantees, supporting updates, and in-
curring practical storage overhead.
1We take the shared-nothing architecture into account since it is highly scalable.
2.1 Threat model
We consider the honest-but-curious model [15]. In this model, an
attacker examines data stored on the cloud to glean sensitive
information, but follows the protocol as specified and does not
change the datasets or query results. Also, we consider three
types of attackers : (1) the offline attacker is able to access a copy
of the encrypted datasets and secure indices (e.g., by stealing
the hard drives), (2) the online attacker is able to observe any
information available at the cloud or being exchanged between
the cloud and the trusted components, and (3) the informed on-
line attacker is an online attacker that further has background
knowledge about the data distribution of the incoming time of
real data.
2.2 Security
2.2.1 Differential privacy. The ϵ-differential privacy
model [11] requires that any possible individual record can
only have a limited impact on the output distribution of
an ϵ-differentially private function. This model considers a
very strong adversary that is not computationally-bounded
(information-theoretic guarantees). Definition 1 gives a formal
definition.
Definition 1 (ϵ-differential privacy [11, 13]): A randomized
mechanism M satisfies ϵ-differential privacy, if for any set
O ∈ Ranдe(M), and any datasets D and D ′ s.t. D is D ′ with
one record more or one record less,
Pr [M(D) = O] ≤ eϵ · Pr [M(D ′) = O]
where ϵ represents the privacy level. A smaller ϵ means stronger
privacy level. The Laplace mechanism is the most common
method to achieve ϵ-differential privacy.
Laplace Mechanism [12]: Let D and D ′ be two datasets such
that D is D ′ with one record more or one record less. Let
Lap(β) be a random variable that has a Laplace distribution
with the probability density function pd f (x, β) = 12β e−|x |/β .
Let f be a real-valued function, the Laplace mechanism adds
Lap(max ∥ f (D)− f (D ′) ∥1 /ϵ) to the output of f , where ϵ > 0.
Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition [27]): LetM1,M2, . . . ,Mr
denote a set of mechanisms and eachMi gives ϵi -differential
privacy. LetM be another mechanism that executes the sequence




2.2.2 Semantic Security. Loosely speaking, a cryptosystem
is semantically secure if it is infeasible for a computationally-
bounded adversary, i.e., a probabilistic polynomial algorithm, to
derive significant information about plaintext from its cipher-
text and any auxiliary information, e.g., obtained from external
sources. Today, AES (in CBC mode) is the common instance of
efficient private key encryption schemes satisfying semantic se-
curity.
Definition 2 (Semantic security [15]): A private key encryption
algorithm Eχ , where χ is the secret key, is semantically secure if
for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithmA there exists a
probabilistic polynomial time algorithmA′ such that for every in-
put datasetD, every auxiliary background knowledge ζ ∈ {0, 1}∗,
every polynomially bounded functionд : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, every
polynomial p(·), every sufficiently large n ∈ N , it holds that:




2.2.3 Unified privacy model. Sahin et al. [33] is based on a
probabilistic relaxation of a variant of differential privacy that
considers computationally bounded adversaries [28] and that
considers the cryptographically-negligible leaks due to the use of
efficient real-world encryption schemes, i.e., AES in CBC mode.
Definition 3 is a simplification of ϵn-SIM-CDP, the simulation-
based computational differential privacy model proposed in [28].
Definition 3 (ϵn -SIM-CDP privacy [28]): The randomized function
fn provides ϵn -SIM-CDP if there exists a function Fn that satisfies
ϵn -differential-privacy and a polynomial p(·), such that for every
input dataset D, every probabilistic polynomial time adversary
A, every auxiliary background knowledge ζ ∈ {0, 1}∗, and every
sufficiently large n ∈ N , it holds that:
Pr [An (fn (D, ζ )) = 1] − Pr [An (Fn (D, ζ )) = 1] ≤ 1
p(n)
Definition 4 ((ϵ, δ )-Probabilistic-SIM-CDP [33]): A randomized
function fn satisfies (ϵ, δ )-Probabilistic-SIM-CDP, if it provides
ϵn-SIM-CDP to each individual with probability greater than or
equal to δ , where δ ∈ [0, 1].
3 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briefly review prior schemeswith respect to the
target requirements. Table 1 gives the corresponding summary.












HVE [8, 36] ✓ ✓
Bucketization [17, 19, 20] ✓ ✓ ✓
OPE [5–7, 26, 31] ✓ ✓ ✓
PBtree [24] ✓ ✓
IBtree [23] ✓ ✓ ✓
ArxRange [30] ✓ ✓
Demertzis et al. [10] ✓ ✓ ✓
PINED-RQ family [33, 34] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Hidden vector encryption (HVE) methods [8, 36] employ asym-
metric cryptography to conceal attributes in an encrypted vector.
A range predicate is privately evaluated on such vector. However,
these schemes incur prohibitive computation and storage costs.
Bucketization approaches [17, 19, 20] partition an attribute do-
main into a finite number of buckets. Each bucket is then assigned
by a random tag (bucket-id). When the client sends a range query
to the server, the buckets that intersect the query are determined
by using the index tag stored at the client. All contents of the
intersecting buckets are finally returned to the client. These ap-
proaches lack formal privacy guarantee.
Order-preserving encryption schemes (OPE) [5–7, 26, 31] trans-
form plaintexts into ciphertexts so that the relative order of their
plaintexts is preserved. This property enables to efficiently exe-
cute range predicate evaluation on encrypted data. Unfortunately,
OPE schemes disclose the underlying data distribution, and hence
they are vulnerable to statistical attacks.
Recently, a few works have taken indexing solutions into account
such as [10, 23, 24, 30, 33]. These schemes seek to maintain a se-
cure index over outsourced data for fast range query processing.
However, most of them [10, 23, 24, 30] suffer from prohibitive
storage overhead. On the other hand, Sahin et al. [33] introduce
an approach constructing clear secure indexes, called PINED-
RQ indexes, for serving efficient range queries. The efficiency is
enabled by the secure index while the security relies on computa-
tional differential privacy guarantees. Although PINED-RQ index
is small in space, this scheme publishes data in batches, hence
suffering from bottlenecks in the system as data arrives at high
speed. Tran et al. [34] later introduce an index template-based
approach, PINED-RQ++, to handle this limitation. Similar to prior
schemes, high ingestion throughput still remains challenging for
these solutions.
As shown in Table 1, the PINED-RQ family outperforms its coun-
terparts with regard to the target requirements. To achieve our
goal, we thus develop our solution based on this family. Particu-
larly, we address the drawback of modest throughput in PINED-
RQ.
4 ANALYSIS OF THE PINED-RQ FAMILY
This section gives thorough analyses of the PINED-RQ family [33,
34] and points out their drawbacks. Based on them, we develop
our solutions in the Section 5.
(a) Clear index (b) Perturbed index
Figure 2: Sample PINED-RQ index
4.1 Overview
Building index. There are two primary steps to build a secure
PINED-RQ index.
Step 1 - Building an index. PINED-RQ is inspired from B+Trees. In
PINED-RQ, the set of all nodes is defined as a histogram covering
the domain of an indexed attribute (e.g., the participants’ body
temperature (Temp)), as illustrated in Figure 2a. Each leaf node
has a count that represents the number of records falling within
its interval. It also keeps pointers to those records. Likewise, the
root and any internal node have a range and a count, combining
the intervals and the counts of their children, respectively.
Step 2 - Perturbing an index. All counts in the index are inde-
pendently perturbed by Laplace noise [12]. The noise may be
positive or negative, thereby after this step, the count of a node
may increase or decrease, respectively. As shown in Figure 2b,
the count of node 4 changes from 1 to -1 while the count of
node 6 changes from 1 to 2. Such changes consequently lead to
inconsistencies between the noisy count of a leaf node and the
number of pointers it holds. To address this issue, PINED-RQ
adds dummy records to the dataset when a leaf node receives
positive noise, otherwise, if a leaf node receives negative noise,
real records are removed from the dataset. The records removed
are then inserted into the corresponding overflow array which
is a fixed-size array. This overflow array is filled with dummy
records if it has free space. As illustrated in Figure 2b, the record
(David) belonging to node 4 is removed from the dataset while
one dummy record is added and linked to node 6. Lastly, the
perturbed index, the encrypted dataset, and the overflow arrays
are published to the cloud.
Query processing on indexed data. A range query will start
from the root of an index. It then traverses the child of any node
that has a non-negative count and intersects with the query
range. This is repeated recursively until the leaves of the index
are reached. At the leaves that overlap the query range, their
records and overflow arrays are returned.
Building index with index template. To adapt PINED-RQ to
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the context of high rate of incoming data, Tran et al. [34] have
previously developed PINED-RQ++ that builds a secure index
based on the notion of index template. In particular, the collec-
tor initially creates an index template and perturbs it by using
Laplace noise. This means that the count of bins at first contains
only noise. The real count of bins will be updated during a pub-
lishing time interval, which is defined as the period from when
an index template is created to when it is published. During a
publishing time interval, whenever a new record arrives, the
index template is updated with the record. Next, the collector
encrypts and forwards this record to the cloud. At the end of
each publishing time interval, the updated index template is pub-
lished, and the cloud associates it with earlier published records
to produce a secure index.
To manage positive noise, being represented by dummy records,
the collector can send dummy records to the cloud according to
the actual distribution of the sending time of the real records. On
the other hand, for negative noise, if a leaf node initially receives
negative noise c, the collector moves the first c records (when
they arrive) of that leaf node to the corresponding overflow array.
Figure 3: Perturbed index template and matching table
(the corresponding PINED-RQ index is presented in Fig-
ure 2b)
To privately keep the relationships between published records
and index template leaves, PINED-RQ++ utilizes a matching ta-
ble (see Figure 3). In particular, a record is tagged by a random
number instead of the real id of a leaf prior to being sent to the
cloud. When the matching table is published at the end of each
publishing time interval, the cloud uses it to reconstruct pointers
between leaves and published data.
Generally, the workflow at the collector starts with initiating
a new index template. When new data arrives, it sequentially
passes a series of components, as depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Workflow at the collector of PINED-RQ++
• Parser transforms incoming data into a pre-defined for-
mat.
• Checker buffers the parsed record at the collector as its
indexed attribute belongs to a negative leaf. The index tem-
plate is then updated. Otherwise, that record is forwarded
to the next component.
• Enricher adds a random number (id) to the record.
• Updater updates the index template and matching table
based on the record.
• Encrypter encrypts the record and gets e-record (en-
crypted record). The encrypter finally sends a pair of <id,
e-record> to the cloud.
Parallel architecture of PINED-RQ++. Since the heavy work-
flow greatly degrades the throughput at the collector, Tran et al.
[34] have introduced a parallel version of PINED-RQ++. Its
overview architecture is depicted in Figure 5. Parallel PINED-
RQ++ distributively processes heavy tasks on a set of independent
Figure 5: Architecture of parallel PINED-RQ++
machines (e.g., computing nodes), namely updater and encrypter.
As a result, ingestion throughput exhibits a significant improve-
ment. Nonetheless, several challenges still remain in this archi-
tecture. We now identify the obstacles that hinder PINED-RQ++
from achieving a scalable solution.
4.2 Limitations
Partial parallelism. In PINED-RQ++, the index template is pro-
posed to temporarily store information that is necessary to build
the secure index later. By doing it, the count variables of the in-
dex template are updated and referenced by the updater and the
checker, respectively, during a publishing time interval. The index
template is thus considered as a shared data structure, that does
not run simultaneously in parallel PINED-RQ++. Furthermore,
the checker depends on the parser for the checking operation.
Hence, both parser and checker are organized to run in sequence
at the collector (see Figure 5). Unfortunately, the parsing task
usually takes time, especially in case of large record size. Thus,
the parser mainly makes the ingestion throughput of the parallel
PINED-RQ++ incredibly degraded. For instance, our experiments
shows that the parsing task reduces the throughput of the collec-
tor by over 50% when we use NASA dataset [1].
Heavily updating index template. Since PINED-RQ++ uses
the whole index template for updating and checking incoming
data, there are some unnecessary overheads at the collector in
terms of memory usage and computation. For example, an up-
date always requires traversing from the root to leaves of the
index template, having a complexity of O(logk n), where n is
the number of leaves and k is the branching factor. Likely, the
checker faces the same complexity for checking a record whether
it belongs to negative leaf or not. These tasks will take time to
process records and diminish the ingestion ability of the system,
especially when the domain of index template is huge. The sit-
uation is even worse when all tasks which reference the index
template have to be processed sequentially.
Synchronous publication. Both PINED-RQ++ and its parallel
version are designed to synchronously publish datasets to the
cloud. In other words, they will start a new publication only
if the current publication is sent to the cloud. This mechanism
may create congestion in some circumstances. For instance, at
the end of each publishing time interval, the collector needs to
generate overflow arrays whose size primarily relies upon sev-
eral configurable parameters, namely domain size, security level
(e.g., ϵ), and bin interval. These parameters vary for different
applications, thereby the size of overflow arrays will also change
accordingly. As the size of overflow arrays is large, the collector
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spends long time for generating overflow arrays, giving a heavy
burden on the ingestion performance or even bottlenecks at this
component.
5 INGESTION FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE
RANGE QUERY (FRESQUE)
Figure 6: Architecture of FRESQUE
We first present below the key design features of FRESQUE that
tackle the main limitations of PINED-RQ++ [34] (see Section 4.2).
Then we describe how FRESQUE copes with the informed on-
line attacker (see Section 2.1). Finally we present the complete
architecture of FRESQUE.
5.1 Key Design Features
(a) A fully parallel architecture. As stated earlier, partial
parallelism mainly causes low ingestion throughput in PINED-
RQ++. To deal with that, we aim at making the collector fully
distributed by parallelizing all heavy jobs (e.g., parser and en-
crypter) on a cluster of computing nodes.
The difficulty is that the checker, that resides between the parser
and the encrypter in the workflow, cannot be parallelized since it
relies not only on the parser but also on a shared data structure
(e.g., index template). This means that the checker should be
positioned after the parser and cannot be run in parallel. In fact,
we can run the parser and the encrypter on multiple computing
nodes while the checker runs sequentially at another node2. After
incoming records are parsed at the instances of the parser, they
are sent to the checker. These records are then checked by the
checker before being sent back to the instances of the encrypter.
Nevertheless, this approach would increase unnecessary commu-
nication overheads among components at the collector. Instead,
we position the checker after the parser and the encrypter in the
workflow, as illustrated in Figure 6. This approach allows to scale
the intake ability of the collector without creating unnecessary
transmission overheads. We then add additional information (e.g.,
leaf offset) to the ciphertext of the record so that the checker can
know which leaf the record belongs to.
(b) Array representation of Leaves (AL). To address the prob-
lem of heavily updating index template, we replace the index
template by an array representation of its leaves for the updating
and checking operations in our new architecture. Such array
representation is small to keeps in memory and accessing array
2The encrypter can further benefit from hardware cryptographic modules.
elements requires constant time, O(1). Particularly, the collector
maintains two arrays of integers, one with noise (ALN) and the
other without noise (AL). The former is used to check whether a
record falls within a negative leaf or not while the latter is mainly
used to count the number of real records passing the collector.
Each element of AL/ALN represents the true count/noise of a leaf,
respectively. The size of the two arrays is equal to the number of
leaves of the index template. Note that the AL contains the true
count of leaves while the IT only contains noise, thereby the two
components are sufficient to compute the secure index.
To integrate such data representation into the new architecture,
for a given value, the collector needs to know the leaf offset of
the corresponding element in AL(N). Thanks to the strongly con-
strained shape of the PINED-RQ index, the leaf offset of a record
can be easily obtained based on the configurable parameters of
the system. Given parameters, namely domain min (dmin ), do-
main max (dmax ), bin interval (Ib ), and an indexed attribute value
(v), the leaf offset (Ov ) of v can be achieved as follows.
Ov ←min(⌊(v − dmin )/Ib ⌋, ⌊(dmax − dmin )/Ib ⌋ − 1)
With such an approach, the checker is lightweight enough to
avoid performance bottlenecks even if it runs sequentially.
(c) Asynchronously publishing mechanism. To address the
issues of the synchronous publishing mechanism, we design
our new architecture to asynchronously publish datasets. To this
purpose, we add a new component to our architecture, named
merger, that runs independently of the ingestion component
(e.g., dispatcher), as depicted in Figure 6. The merger is only re-
sponsible for publishing tasks, namely building overflow arrays
and combining a secure index from the AL and the IT (Index
Templates). At the end of each publishing time interval, the pub-
lishing tasks are shifted to the merger, and a new publication is
immediately initiated at the dispatcher. With this approach, while
the dispatcher ingests data for a new publication, the merger per-
forms the publishing tasks for the previous one. This eliminates
the burden of the publishing tasks on the ingesting component
and prevents potential bottlenecks at the collector. More impor-
tantly, the asynchronous publishing method allows the system to
continuously consume incoming data with a very small latency
for starting a new publication. Such property partially improves
the ingestion throughput.
By using the asynchronous publication strategy, all components
in FRESQUE, including the dispatcher and the merger, run inde-
pendently. To ensure data consistency among publications, e.g.,
how a component determines to which publication a record be-
longs, wemark each publicationwith a uniquemonotonic number,
named publication number.
5.2 Upgrading PINED-RQ++ for Coping with
Informed Online Attackers
Information about the noise injected, e.g. dummy/removed
records of a publication, may be disclosed to the informed online
attacker if the order of the incoming data at the cloud is the
same as the order of the incoming data at the collector. Indeed,
since the informed online attacker has the time at which records
(dummy or true) arrive at the cloud, his background knowledge
on the time distribution of real data can enable him to distinguish
(probabilistically) between incoming true records and incoming
dummy records (positive noise), or to gain partial knowledge of
the number of removed records (negative noise). First, the records
removed by the checker at the collector (if they fall in the interval
of a negative leaf - see Section 4) do not leave the collector before
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the end of the publishing time interval. Their absence may reveal
to the informed online attacker information about the values of
negative noises. Second, the arrival of records at the cloud at
unexpected times makes them more likely to be dummy record
(information about positive noises). In PINED-RQ++, the collec-
tor releases dummy records according to the true distribution of
the incoming time of real data for confusing the informed online
attacker. This obviously requires to know the distribution in ad-
vance, which may be difficult to achieve in real-life applications.
We now seek to design a new noise management method that
mitigates privacy leaks against the informed online attacker and
does not depend on any pre-defined distribution of the incoming
time of real data.
To address this issue, we introduce a new component, called ran-
domer, to our architecture (see Figure 6). It aims at perturbing
the distribution of the incoming time of real data at the collector
so that the insertion of dummy records or the deletion of real
records are hidden from the adversary. The randomer consists
of a fixed-size buffer and a trigger function. The former is used
to mix incoming real and dummy records together while the
latter is used to control the size of the buffer. In particular, all
dummy records of a publication are first generated and are uni-
formly at random sent to the buffer of the randomer during a
publishing time interval. For example, suppose a publication has
100 dummy records, then 100 time points are chosen uniformly
at random over the current publishing time interval, and one
dummy record is released at each time point. When a record
(real/dummy) arrives at the randomer, it is buffered here. If the
randomer buffer is full, then the randomer randomly picks one
record in the buffer and releases it to the next component. Note
that at any time point when one record is picked and released, it
may be a real or dummy record. As a result, if a new record ar-
rives the cloud at an improbable time point, the adversary cannot
conclude with certainty whether it is dummy or not. Similarly,
when the adversary does not see any record at an expected time
point at the cloud, she/he cannot be sure it is removed or not due
to the uncertainty caused by the randomer. The leakage caused
by dealing naively with positive or negative noise (i.e., dummy
records or removed true records) is thus addressed by the ran-
domer. Moreover, FRESQUE does not require knowing in advance
any data distribution.
Figure 7: Randomer : Possible Issue of a Tiny Buffer
Challenges of randomer. One of the challenges of using ran-
domer is how to choose a right size for its buffer. Intuitively, a
large buffer gives high security. However, if the chosen size is too
big, the systemmay confront bottlenecks at collector, particularly
at the checking node. Otherwise, a tiny buffer may result above
leak (the extreme case being a buffer of size 1). As an example
depicted in Figure 7, we first assume that no real data is present
during the period between t0 and t1 (the publishing time interval
is [t0, tn ]) and the size of the buffer is much smaller than the
total number of dummy records. Since all dummy records are
randomly released over a publishing time interval, it may happen
that the buffer is full of dummy records, e.g., during the period
[t0, t1]. The trigger function is thus activated and dummy records
in the buffer are released before t1. These dummy records will
be recognized by the adversary who has prior knowledge about
real data distribution. Fortunately, such situation only happens
as the randomer buffer is much smaller than the total number
of dummy records. Otherwise, if the randomer buffer is large
enough, no record will appear at the cloud in that period. There-
fore, the buffer size must be chosen to be sufficiently larger than
the total number of dummy records of the publication.
A straightforward solution is to determine the buffer size by mul-
tiplying the actual number of the dummy records of a publication
by several times. However, since we will publish the whole buffer
at the end of the publishing time interval, the adversary may infer
the size of the buffer, and hence the actual number of dummy
records can be leaked. So the method of determining buffer size
must (*) not depend on the real number of dummy records and
(**) being larger than the number of the dummy records of a
publication.
Note that since dummy records are generated due to the Laplace
noise, the number of dummy records varies with each publication.
It is thus difficult to choose a right capacity for the randomer
buffer while meeting both (*) and (**). Fortunately, the noise
in FRESQUE is sampled from the Laplace distribution, we can
then choose buffer size based on the inverse CDF of the Laplace
distribution with a very high probability, δ ′. Intuitively, this
approach gives an upper bound on the number of dummy records.
Given a set ofm leaves, denoted L = {l1, ..., lm }, we probabilisti-
cally compute the maximum number of dummy records of leaf li
based on the inverse CDF of the Laplace distribution, considered
as si . Then, T =
∑m
i=1 si is viewed as the maximum number of
dummy records of an index. To guarantee the buffer size is larger
than T , we multiply it by a configurable coefficient, α . To ensure
the buffer size is larger than the total number of dummy records,
we suggest to set α ≥ 2. Then, the buffer size, S , of the randomer
is: S =
∑m
i=1 si × α (or S = T × α ), where α ≥ 2.
Finally, the position of the randomer within the architecture
of the collector is important as well: it must be put before the
checker and the updater (so that it processes all records, including
the removed ones) and after the parser and the encrypter (for
obvious latency reasons).
5.3 Architecture of FRESQUE
Following the key design features in Section 5.1, we now detail
our ingestion framework to support efficient range query process-
ing over encrypted data. Especially, we describe the orchestration
of different components in this architecture.
(a) Ingestion life cycle. The collector of FRESQUE runs on a
small cluster of commodity machines (see Figure 6). At the col-
lector, one (and only one) node runs the Dispatcher (D) and all
worker nodes in the cluster run a Computing Node (CN) while
the randomer, the checker, and the updater run on the same
Checking node (C).
When new records arrive to the dispatcher, they are immediately
sent to the computing nodes according to a round robbin ap-
proach. This approach is used for the sake of load balancing. The
computing node first pre-processes incoming data to get pairs of
<leaf offset, e-record>. These pairs are then sent to the checking
node. After being randomized and checked at the checking node,
such pairs are forwarded to the cloud or the merger. Note that
the dispatcher, the computing node, the merger, and the checking
node can coexist on the same node.
(b) Instantiation of FRESQUE. In order to demonstrate how data
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(a) Initialization
(b) During a time interval
(c) At publishing time
Figure 8: An example demonstrating how FRESQUE processes incoming data by using two computing nodes. Assume that
the size of randomer buffer is 4 pairs of e-record.
is processed at the collector and transported to the cloud, Figure
6 shows the composition of FRESQUE running on five nodes at
the collector and Figure 8 gives a running example.
Dispatcher (D): At the beginning of a publishing time interval,
the dispatcher initiates an Index Template (IT), dummy records,
and a Publication Number (PN), as illustrated in Figure 8a. The
dispatcher then sends the IT, PN and all dummy records to the
checking node. During a publishing time interval, whenever the
dispatcher receives new data from data sources, it distributes
the data to the computing nodes in a round-robin fashion. As an
example shown in Figure 8b, there are three records, (Bob,37),
(Alice,39), (Diana,38), arriving in order at the dispatcher. These
records are then distributed to the two computing nodes. At
the end of each publishing time interval, the dispatcher sends
a publishing message to all available computing nodes and to
the checker. By using the asynchronous publishing method, a
new publication is immediately started after a publishing mes-
sage is sent instead of waiting for the publishing tasks to be
done. This allows the system to continuously ingest arrivals.
By completely removing heavy jobs (e.g., parsing, encrypting,
and checking) from the dispatcher and using the asynchronous
publishing method, throughput ingestion is maximized at this
component.
Computing Node (CN): During a publishing time interval,
when new data comes, the computing node parses the raw data
into a record, calculates the leaf offset, and encrypts it. Then, a
pair of <leaf offset, e-record> is transferred to the checking node.
As showed in Figure 8b, after passing the two computing nodes,
three records are now parsed, encrypted, and associated with the
corresponding leaf offsets, 0, 2, 1, respectively. When the com-
puting node receives a publishing message from the dispatcher,
it waits for a done message from the checking node. Notably,
during the meantime, all incoming data will be processed and
stored in local in-memory buffers at the computing nodes. By
doing it, the delay of performing heavy tasks on buffered data is
reduced when a new publication is started.
As mentioned earlier, the parser and the encrypter mainly cause
throughput degradation in the system. With the parallel ap-
proach, the degradation is reduced significantly and only relies
on the number of the computing nodes used. Interestingly, this
approach not only allows to easily scale the throughput up, but
also shortens the publishing time at the collector. For instance,
PINED-RQ++ has to sequentially encrypt removed records and
insert them into overflow arrays at the end of each publishing
time interval, whereas they are now encrypted in a parallel man-
ner by a set of networked machines during that period. As a
result, at the end of each publishing time interval, the collector
only randomly inserts removed encrypted records into the corre-
sponding overflow arrays before transferring them to the cloud,
reducing the publishing time in FRESQUE.
Checking node (C): At the beginning of a publishing time in-
terval, the checking node receives Index Template (IT) and Pub-
lication Number (PN) from the dispatcher. It first initiates the
corresponding AL and ALN (see Figure 8b). The checking node
then forwards the IT to the merger while the PN is sent to the
cloud. During a publishing time interval, when a pair of <leaf
offset, e-record> arrives, it stores that pair in the buffer of the
randomer. If the buffer is full, one of them is randomly picked
and passed to the checker. Next, the checker gets its leaf offset
(e.g., i) from the selected pair. If the ith element of ALN is less
than zero, the checker increases the value of the ith element of
both ALN and AL by one, and then sends that pair to the merger
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as removed. Otherwise, that pair is sent to the updater, and only
the value of the ith element of AL is increased by one. Finally,
that pair is sent to the cloud. As the example presented in Figure
8b, when the pair <0, (Bob,37)> comes to the checking node at
timestamp t0, it is inserted into the randomer’s buffer. When this
pair is released at timestamp t1, the 0th element of AL is increased
by one since the 0th element of ALN is positive. Otherwise, at
timestamp t2, when the pair <1, (Diana,38)> is considered, since
it belongs to a negative element of ALN, the 1st element of AL
and ALN are both increased by one and this pair is then sent to
the merger.
When the checking node receives publishing messages from all
available computing nodes, it will send the updated AL to the
merger (see Figure 8c). We emphasize that the condition of re-
ceiving publishing messages from all computing nodes needs to
be guaranteed so that the consistency of publications is achieved.
In other words, it makes sure that all (dummy/real) data of the
current publication, that are sent by the dispatcher, are received
by the checking node. The randomer buffer is then shuffled and
published to the cloud. Finally, the checking node sends a done
message back to the computing nodes.
It is worth noting that the checker and the updater will ignore the
dummy records when they pass the checking node. This means
that the counts of AL and ALN are independent of such dummy
data. To achieve it, the checker and the updater need to perceive
which incoming record is dummy in order to ignore it during
the updating process. Nonetheless, the difficulty is that they all
become ciphertexts after being encrypting by the computing
nodes. To address it, we add to dummy records a special flag
(e.g., -1) to distinguish them from real data. This straightforward
technique allows the checker and the updater to know which
record is dummy or real. As shown in Figure 8b, at timestamp
t0, a dummy pair is released by the checking node, and does not
lead to any update on AL and ALN.
Even if all tasks at the checking node are designed to run sequen-
tially such as the checker and the updater, they do not have much
impact on the ingestion throughput at the collector. Moreover,
thanks to the array representation, our architecture diminishes
the complexity of the updating and checking tasks fromO(logk n)
to O(1), and hence shortening the delay of processing a record
and boosting the consumption throughput.
Merger (M): At the beginning of each publishing time interval,
the merger receives IT and PN from the checking node, then
keeps them in memory. During a publishing time interval, the
mergermay receive removed records from the checker.Whenever
the merger receives the updated AL, it triggers a new merging
job that performs publishing tasks, e.g., combining IT and AL to
achieve the complete secure index, generating overflow arrays
(OAs) to conceal the removed records. Finally, the merger sends
them to the cloud with the corresponding PN, as shown in Figure
8c.
Cloud: When the cloud receives a new PN from the checking
node, it creates a new file for storing the incoming data. However,
when its secure index is published by the merger, the published
data will be read from the file on disk for a matching process and
finally written back to disk again. Such approach gives rise to
high I/O overhead. Instead, we keep small information about the
published data, e.g., metadata, that is used for the matching pro-
cess. Specifically, when a pair of <leaf offset, e-record> arrives,
the cloud writes the e-record to disk, gets its physical address,
and caches a pair of <leaf offset, physical location> in memory.
To boost the matching process, we organizemetadata in the form
of <leaf offset, list of physical locations>, as demonstrated in
Figure 8b. Such metadata is relatively small and independent of
the size of e-records. When a publication comes from the merger,
the matching process immediately associates the physical ad-
dress of e-records with leaves based on the cached metadata. The
metadata is finally destroyed (see Figure 8c).
(c) Query processing. In FRESQUE, when a query comes at the
cloud, it is evaluated on both indexed and unindexed data. With
regard to indexed data, the query processing strategy is applied
as in Section 4.1. Meanwhile, unindexed data are processed one
by one based on the query range. The (removed) records have a
range overlapping the query range at the cloud, the randomer,
and the merger are returned to the client.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We develop FRESQUE that builds a PINED-RQ index [33] during
a publishing time interval. With such an approach, at the end
of each publishing time interval, all parts of the index (e.g., IT,
AL, and removed e-records) are combined at the merger to get a
secure index and overflow arrays. In other words, this process
only occurs at the trusted collector, and hence FRESQUE appar-
ently inherits the privacy protection level of the PINED-RQ index
and trivially satisfies (ϵ, δ )-Probabilistic-SIM-CDP against offline
attackers and (simple) online attackers.
The main difference between FRESQUE and PINED-RQ with re-
spect to the index creation function is that FRESQUE publishes
encrypted records immediately. Informed online attackers may
be able to gain information about positive or negative noises
based on the expected time distribution of incoming real records.
However, thanks to the randomer, this leakage is mitigated. The-
orem 2 claims the security of FRESQUE.
Theorem 2 (Security of FRESQUE): The index creation function
of FRESQUE satisfies (ϵ, δ )-Probabilistic-SIM-CDP [33] against
offline attackers and (simple) online attackers, and mitigates the
information leak against informed online attackers.
Proof. (Sketch) We only consider informed online attackers be-
cause the two other attackers are trivial.
Considering dummy records (information leak about pos-
itive noises). First, we consider the case where a record arrives
at the cloud at the time point at which there is real data. Since
real/dummy records are randomly mixed together before being
released, the adversary is unable to distinguish dummy records
from real ones and does not obtain additional useful information
about the values of the positive noises.
Second, we consider the case where a record arrives at the cloud
at an unlikely time point at which there is no real data. This
situation happens when a dummy record is inserted into a full
randomer buffer. This means that with high probability the ran-
domer buffer contains both real and dummy records. When re-
ceiving a record recently picked from the buffer, the cloud is thus
unable to distinguish dummy records from real ones and does
not learn additional information about the values of the positive
noises.
Third, we consider the case where the checking node sends the
full randomer buffer to the cloud at the end of a publishing time
interval. Dummy records are mixed with real ones at the ran-
domer during a publishing time interval. Additionally, the ratio
between real and dummy data at any time point is hidden from
the adversary (see Section 5.2), hence the adversary does not
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obtain additional useful information about the values of the posi-
tive noises from this case.
Fourth, we consider the case where the randomer contains only
dummy records and no real ones. Note that such situation only
occurs if all dummy records are released before real data arrives
at the collector. If the buffer of the randomer were allowed to be
smaller than or equal to the total number of dummy records, a
dummy record would be picked with certainty and released to the
cloud. As a result, the adversary would learn with certainty that
it is dummy. However, FRESQUE requires that the buffer of the
randomer is chosen to be much larger than the total number of
dummy records of a publication, with (tunable) high probability
(see Section 5.2). This makes this case highly improbable.
Considering removed records (information leak about
negative noises). Since dummy records will not be deleted by
the checking node, we only focus on real records. Recall that
the decision to remove a real record is taken by the checker, af-
ter the randomer, and that removed records are buffered by the
merger in order to be published within the overflow arrays at
the end of the publishing time interval. Without randomer, the
artificial removal of records due to negative noise may impact the
number of records sent to the cloud and thus, slightly, the time
distribution of the records sent to the cloud. However, first, the
additional dummy records mitigate the decrease in the number
of records overall (recall that the Laplace distribution used for
generating the noises is symmetric around 0), and second, with
the randomer, the delay introduced by the randomer buffer in
releasing both dummy and real records also impacts the time
distribution of records to the cloud, similar to the removal of true
records, which mitigates the information leak about the values
of the negative noises. □
Comparison with PINED-RQ [33]. The highest security of
FRESQUE is achieved when the coefficient α is chosen so that the
randomer buffer can contain the whole dataset and all dummy
records. In that case, at the end of each publishing time interval,
the randomer shuffles and sends the buffer to the cloud along
with a secure index and overflow arrays. It is easy to see that
this is exactly the publishing process of PINED-RQ. Thus, in that
case, FRESQUE has the same level of privacy against informed
online attackers as PINED-RQ, and thus also satisfies exactly
(ϵ, δ )-Probabilistic-SIM-CDP against all attackers.
7 EVALUATION
We evaluate FRESQUE against PINED-RQ++ due to its outperfor-
mance compared to other prior schemes (see Table 1). We mainly
focus on the metrics contributing to the scalability of the sys-
tem, namely ingestion throughput and publishing latency at the
collector as well as at the cloud.
7.1 Benchmark Environment
Table 2: Experimental environment
Component CPU (2.4 GHz) Memory (GB) Disk (GB)
Dispatcher 4 8 80
Merger 4 8 80
Checking node 4 8 80
Computing node 2 2 20
Data source 4 16 80
Cloud 16 64 160
We implemented FRESQUE in Java 1.8.03. Data was encrypted by
the Java package (javax.crypto). We ran our experiments on the
3The code is available at https://gitlab.inria.fr/vtran/fresque.git.




















Figure 9: Ingestion throughput of FRESQUE














Figure 10: FRESQUE’s improvement compared to PINED-
RQ++
Galactica platform [4] and organized FRESQUE as a cluster of 17
nodes, including 12 computing nodes, running on Ubuntu 14.04.4
LTS. Each node was used to run one component of FRESQUE.
The configurations of nodes are detailed in Table 2. The TCP
socket was used for exchanging data among the components of
FRESQUE.
We evaluate our solution on two real datasets: NASA log [1]
(1, 569, 898 records, five attributes) and Gowalla [22] (6, 442, 892
records, three attributes). We use the reply byte and check-in
time as indexed attributes, respectively. Based on these datasets,
the domain of the reply byte is divided into 3421 bins and each
bin interval represents 1 KB. Meanwhile, the domain of the check-
in time is 626 bins and each bin interval implies one hour. The
fanout is set to 16. We use a publishing time interval of 60 seconds
and incoming data rate is 200k records per second. The initial
privacy budget and coefficient is set to 1 and 2, respectively, for
all experiments unless otherwise stated. Both δ and δ ′ are set to
99% and every experiment was run over ten minutes. Then, we
present the averaged results of ten publications in Section 7.2.
7.2 Results
Ingestion throughput. We first present the ingestion through-
put of FRESQUE with a varied number of computing nodes. Then
we compare its ingestion throughput to those of the (non-)parallel
PINED-RQ++. The results in Figure 9 show that the throughput
of FRESQUE significantly increases as the number of computing
nodes goes up. Especially, the highest throughput is reached
at ∼142k records/second (NASA) and at ∼165k records/second
(Gowalla) with 12 and 8 computing nodes respectively. As com-
pared to ArxRange [30], one of the state-of-the-art solutions,
FRESQUE reaches an ingestion throughput that is at least two
orders of magnitude higher.
(a) Comparison with non-parallel PINED-RQ++. With the given
settings, non-parallel PINED-RQ++ is able to ingest only 3,159
records/s in NASA and 13,223 records/s in Gowalla. Such inges-
tion throughputs are substantially lower than those of FRESQUE.
The results in Figure 10 demonstrate the outperformance of
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Figure 11: Comparison of ingestion throughput with par-
allel PINED-RQ++
FRESQUE compared to non-parallel PINED-RQ++. The enhance-
ment goes up as the number of computing nodes grows. The
highest improvement can be seen as the collector is configured as
a 12-computing node cluster, and the ingestion throughput is im-
proved by ∼11× and ∼43× in Gowalla and NASA dataset, respec-
tively. Even if only two computing nodes are used, FRESQUE can
achieve the improvement of 7.61× (NASA) and 2.69× (Gowalla).
Compared to Gowalla, NASA always exhibits higher improve-
ment with the same number of computing nodes. The major
source of this gap comes from the fact that the record size and
the domain of NASA record are larger than those of Gowalla.
Based on such observation, we can conclude that FRESQUE would
be more beneficial as datasets have larger size and/or domain.
(b) Comparison with parallel PINED-RQ++. The throughput of
FRESQUE is always higher than that of parallel PINED-RQ++ as
we vary the number of computing nodes at the collector, as shown
in Figure 11. The setting of 12-computing node cluster gives the
biggest gap, the throughput of FRESQUE is ∼5.6× (NASA) and
∼2.2× (Gowalla) better than that of parallel PINED-RQ++. Noted
that since the throughput in FRESQUE reaches the peak as we use
8 computing nodes in Gowalla, the use of more computing nodes
does not bring more benefit.
Throughput degradation.We measure the throughput degra-
dation at the collector of the three prototypes. Such metric is
obtained by comparing their maximum ingestion throughput
with the maximum incoming throughput (without any process-
ing on incoming data) at the collector. As shown in Figure 12,
FRESQUE experiences the lowest throughput degradation among
the three prototypes, with a reduction of at least ∼3.9× (com-
pared to parallel PINED-RQ++) in NASA, and at most ∼7.9×
(compared to PINED-RQ++) in Gowalla.















Figure 12: Throughput degradation at the collector
Publishing time. We now turn our attention to the publish-
ing time metric, i.e., the time required to publish a dataset with
FRESQUE and with parallel PINED-RQ++. Noted that FRESQUE
consists of the three main components, namely the dispatcher,
the checking node, and the merger which mainly decide the pub-
lishing time at the collector. We thus measure the delay of the
three components separately. Additionally, we consider the time
needed to perform a matching process at the cloud. This is be-
cause a long delay of this process might also lead to bottlenecks.
(a) Publishing time at the dispatcher. As shown in Figure 13, the
time is always lower than 520ms with NASA and 200ms with
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Figure 13: Publishing time in FRESQUE
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Figure 14: Comparison of publishing time at collector
with parallel PINED-RQ++
Gowalla. The delay even gradually decreases as the number of
computing nodes increases. In particular, the dispatcher takes
only 101ms (NASA) and 19ms (Gowalla) for performing the pub-
lishing tasks in a 12-computing node cluster.
(b) Publishing time at the merger. The results in Figure 13 indi-
cates that the time is virtually unchanged in the two datasets as
their size changes. Specifically, the time with NASA fluctuates be-
tween 149ms and 191ms while that with Gowalla varies between
18ms and 20ms. Since the domain size of NASA (3421 bins) is
larger than the one of Gowalla (626 bins), the NASA experiences
a higher publishing time than that of the Gowalla dataset.
(c) Publishing time at the checking node. In this study, we attempt
to design FRESQUE so that the checking node has a lightweight
publishing job and has a reduced impact on the ingestion per-
formance. In particular, the checking node only sends the buffer
of the randomer to the cloud and the updated AL to the merger
at the end of each publishing time interval. The results in Fig-
ure 13 show that the time is under 600ms with NASA and 80ms
with Gowalla. It can be understood that the publishing time at
the checking node is mainly represented by the time of sending
the randomer buffer that varies according to the required level
of security. A huge randomer buffer results in long publishing
time at this component. Fortunately, since the computing nodes
always process and cache incoming data during the meantime,
the impact on the ingestion throughput is negligible. We will
evaluate the randomer below in the latest part of this section.
(d) Matching time at the cloud. To show the efficiency of FRESQUE
at the cloud side, we measure the time required to associatemeta-
data (physical locations of records) with published index. As
depicted in Figure 13, the time in FRESQUE goes up according to
data size. Nonetheless, FRESQUE spends only 877ms and 837ms
on matching the large dataset of 8.1M records (NASA) and 9.8M
records (Gowalla), respectively. These performances come from
the deletion of the matching table from FRESQUE’s architecture.
(e) Comparison with parallel PINED-RQ++. We now compare pub-
lishing time at the collector between FRESQUE and parallel PINED-
RQ++. Since the different numbers of computing nodes used re-
sult in different publication sizes, we consider the time is required
to publish a record instead of a whole dataset. The results in Fig-
ure 14 show that parallel PINED-RQ++ (dispatcher) takes longer
delay than FRESQUE (dispatcher, checking node, and merger) for
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Figure 15: Comparison ofmatching time at cloudwith par-
allel PINED-RQ++
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Figure 16: Publishing time with different privacy budgets
the two datasets used. Regarding the dispatcher, the publishing
time of FRESQUE is at most ∼62× and ∼127× lower with NASA
and Gowalla, respectively, compared to parallel PINED-RQ++.
Matching time. We also evaluate the matching time needed
to process a publication between parallel PINED-RQ++ and
FRESQUE. The results in Figure 15 show that the time of parallel
PINED-RQ++ increases when publications are larger. For exam-
ple, when a dataset of 5M records is used, the matching time in
parallel PINED-RQ++ reaches ∼78s (NASA) and ∼76s (Gowalla).
In contrast, FRESQUE constantly maintains a short time for pro-
cessing a publication at the cloud, with a maximum is ∼54ms
(NASA) and ∼43ms (Gowalla). The matching time of FRESQUE
is at least two orders of magnitude shorter than that of parallel
PINED-RQ++.
Impact of the randomer. For mitigating the information dis-
closed to the informed online attacker, the randomer maintains
a local buffer for perturbing incoming data. A large buffer may
introduce a bottleneck at the collector. We thus evaluate the im-
pact of this component here. Indeed, the buffer size is mainly
determined by two configurable parameters, namely privacy bud-
get ϵ and coefficient α . Hence, we run various experiments with
varied values of the two parameters to evaluate the impact of the
randomer. We use a configuration of 10 computing nodes.
(a) Privacy budget ϵ .We now consider the impact of the randomer
in terms of publishing time as we use different privacy budgets,
ranging from 0.1 to 2.0, for a publication. In these experiments,
we record the publishing time at the collector (dispatcher, check-
ing node, and merger), and the matching time at the cloud. The
results in Figure 16 show that the privacy budget influences the
publishing time at the three components. Indeed, as a smaller
privacy budget is used, their publishing time goes up. The high-
est increase is witnessed at the checking node, approximately 7s
(NASA) and about 0.8s (Gowalla) for the budget of 0.1. Similarly,
as the privacy budget declines, the size of overflow arrays and
the number of dummy/removed records go up, causing a slight
increase of the publishing time at the dispatcher and the merger.
(b) Coefficient α . We adjust the value of α to see the impact of
randomer on publishing time at the checking node, the merger
and the cloud. As expected, when we increase the value of α , the
publishing time grows (see Figure 17). However, even if α is set
to 20, the checking node only takes about 6s (NASA) and 0.8s
(Gowalla). Also, the time does not change much at the dispatcher,
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Figure 17: Publishing time with different coefficients


















(a) Varying privacy budgets










Figure 18: Ingestion throughput of FRESQUE with ran-
domer
the merger and the cloud.
(c) Impact of the randomer on ingestion throughput.We also con-
sider the ingestion throughput at the collector as we vary the
two parameters ϵ and α . Although the publishing time at the
checking node goes up as we use smaller privacy budget and/or
larger coefficient, the ingestion throughput at the collector is rel-
atively stable. This is because while the checking node prepares
publish the current dataset, including the sending of randomer to
the cloud, incoming data of the new publication is still processed
and buffered at the computing nodes. As it can be seen in Figure
18a and Figure 18b, the results show that the throughput with
the NASA dataset fluctuates between ∼115k records/s and ∼134k
records/s while that of Gowalla ranges from ∼150k records/s to
∼166k records/s.
8 DISCUSSION
We present a possible real-life application of FRESQUE based on
the FluTracking use-case [3].
Flutracking is a web-based survey of influenza-like illness. This
system weekly sends a link via email to all participants who will
then submit required information via a web interface. The submit-
ted data can be managed in a cloud and accessed by authorized
users for analysis and prediction.
Although our description of FRESQUE focuses on the insertion
of one record per individual, it is simple to extend our approach
to the case of multiple records per individual. For example, in
Flutracking [3], an individual can submit personal data several
times to the database, at most once for a week. For such case,
an important question is how to manage privacy budget over
multiple insertions of the same individual.
In the targeted use case, it is unlikely to have multiple records
of the same individual over a short period (e.g., weekly). There-
fore, we can assume that a dataset of each period (e.g., week) is
published with a secure index, and this publication consists of at
most one record per individual. For each dataset, the system uses
a portion of the total privacy budget ϵtotal for constructing a
secure index. To determine how much budget is spent for a publi-
cation, an admin may necessarily determine how long the system
needs secure indices for fast range query processing. ϵtotal is
then divided according to the determined period. For instance, if
the system must maintain indices for one year (52 weeks), then
an admin can divide the total privacy budget ϵtotal into 52 equal
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portions, ϵ1, ..., ϵ52, so that ϵtotal =
∑52
i=1 ϵi . Each of which is
used to publish dataset of one week. Certainly, the system needs
to make sure that an individual contributes at most one record
per publication. Fortunately, thanks to the existing collecting
method of the Flutracking, this work can simply be achieved.
In particular, a unique link can be sent to all participants every
Monday. The link is set to expired and a dataset is published
before the next Monday. This ensures that a participant links to
at most one record per publication.
9 CONCLUSION
This paper presents FRESQUE, a scalable ingestion framework for
secure range query processing over encrypted data on clouds.
We thoroughly analyze and identify the problems of the-state-
of-the-art solutions related to the degradation of the ingestion
throughput, with a special focus on PINED-RQ++. To address
these drawbacks, we design a new architecture that is fully dis-
tributed at the collector. Additionally, we introduce a data rep-
resentation as well as an asynchronous publication mechanism.
All of them together allows FRESQUE to achieve intensive con-
sumption throughput, reaching over 160K records/s. Moreover,
we introduce and carefully integrate the randomer into our new
architecture to improve the practicality and security of FRESQUE
as compared to PINED-RQ++. We formally analyse the security
guarantees of FRESQUE. Lastly, we discuss a potential application
of FRESQUE based on a real-life example. Future works include
coping with multiple records per individual and designing al-
ternative indexes based on well-known highly concurrent data
structures (e.g., Masstree [25] and ART [21]).
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